

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

20 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ALL BRANCH CHIEFS

SUBJECT: Top Secret Memo #66360

The attached memorandum is of considerable importance and has been laid as a priority requirement on SE with a suspense date of 29 February. It is requested that careful study be given it and that each Branch Chief prepare and, in view of the deadline, submit by Friday, 22 February, considered answers to questions (1) through (11) of Section V. The Branch memoranda will form the basis of the Division's reply.

[ ]  
SE/PC/P and C

Attachment (1)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3028  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SE/PC/P AND O

SUBJECT: Top Secret Memo #66360

Attached herewith is an area analysis prepared in outline form by this branch per subject memorandum.

[ Chief, SE/PC-1 ]

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1. Maintenance in power of Communist Government against the will of the Albanian people.
2. a. Complete control of public and private life by internal security force.  
b. Fear of partition of Albania between Greece and Yugoslavia, or domination again by Italy.  
c. Failure of the National Committee for A Free Albania to follow-up the implication of propaganda that liberation is just around the corner.  
d. Gradual arrival of Soviet aid and development of industry.
3. a. 90% of the population despise the present regime and would act against it, if they were supplied the means and were assured of some success. The hatred is based on:
  - (1) Terror
  - (2) Severe economic crisis
  - (3) Assault on Albanian traditions and religious precepts.b. Hope of the population for speedy liberation.  
c. Isolation of Albania from the rest of the Soviet orbit.
4. Reported division in the Communist party and jealousy existing between Hoxha and Shahu. Also the factors listed in para. 3.

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5. Not applicable. We are now engaged in a program of covert psychological warfare.

6. a. Position of Yugoslavia. Failure of Greeks to relinquish their claims to Northern Epirus. Bulgar-Albanian Mutual Aid Treaty.

b. Yugoslavia.

c. In exchange for aid to Tito obtain commitments with respect to Albania and effect a working arrangement with him between the Albanian committee sponsored by Yugoslavia and our NCFA.

7. a. Establishment and maintenance within Albania of a covert operations organization.

b. Procurement of intelligence from within the country.

c. Distribution within the country of propaganda material.

d. Obtaining Albanian publications for our use in propaganda activities.

e. Clandestine distribution of radio receivers within Albania to enable more of the population to listen to broadcasts by Radio Free Albania, RFE and VOA.

f. Initiation of ghost voice operations against Radio Tirana.

g. Establishment of a program of covert economic warfare.

8. Change of policy to enable us to bring about revolution within Albania as soon as we can support it.

9. Tito's continued opposition to the Cominform.

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10. Development of the capability to overthrow the Albanian Government might permit OPC to initiate action which would be used to counteract Soviet moves in other areas of the world.

11. Expand the PW program by stepping up the radio broadcasts, using more powerful equipment; continued leaflet and cartoon drops; continued drops of scarce consumer goods; publicity to enhance the prestige of the NCFA; special coup de main operations to provide incidents of propaganda and psychological warfare value which may be exploited by the PW program; clandestine penetration operations aimed at establishment of a covert operations organization within Albania. We are in a position to support all the actions outlined.

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